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1762

CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE APPROACHING

PEACE.

(Price One Shilling)

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CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE APPROACHING

P E A C E.

When once we are afraid to ſpeak, we are no longer ſafe. TRENCHARD.

L O N D O N:

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M.DCC.LXII.

TO THE

GUARDIANS

OF THE BRITISH

Liberties and Conſtitution.

My Lords and Gentlemen,

PROMPTED by the moſt ardent wiſhes for the welfare of this country, as well as for the honour and happineſs of his Majeſty, the writer preſumes to lay the following Conſiderations before you. He does not ſeek to inflame, but to awaken a due conſideration of our many conqueſts, and the neceſſity of preſerving them at a peace, as the only means of preventing another

war

war in a ſhort time, and as the only means of terrifying our enemies with a true and juſt idea of our national ſtrength, and of our wiſdom and reſolution in continually annihilating their power as often as they break with us: faithfully wedded to theſe ſentiments (the only ones which can be for the true intereſt of the nation, and are the general ſenſe of all the people) let us not make peace, until our enemies will grant us ſuch terms, as ſhall not only be advantageous in themſelves, but ſafe and laſting to the future ſecurity of our lives and happineſs. He confeſſes to have drawn from report his ſuppoſed facts; if that report be falſe, ſo alſo are his arguments, as they are naturally deduced from it. That both theſe may be the caſe, ſhall be prayer, and is the earneſt wiſh, of one of his Majeſty's faithful ſubjects.

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CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE APPROACHING

PEACE.

THE candid public have hitherto looked on the Monitor and North Briton as the trumpeters of faction, and gave little heed to their parallels and quotations from hiſtory, intended to awake in us the remembrance of former times;--but now, what have our eyes beheld! the following letter from authority proclaims the certainty of an approaching peace; at a time when it was expected by all honeſt men, that the career of our arms would not be ſtopped till our enemies were reduced to reaſon; till Newfoundland was retaken, and the parliament had met.

My Lord, *Whitehall, Aug.* 29, 1762.

" I have the Earl of Egremont's directions to acquaint your Lordſhip, that, in conſequence of his Moſt Chriſtian Majeſty's nomination of the Duc de Ninervois to come here to treat of a peace, the King has been pleaſed to name the Duke of Bedford to go to Paris for the ſame purpoſe; and his Grace's appointment will be declared on Wedneſday next the firſt of September. My Lord Egremont thinks it may be of uſe to make this public in the city as ſoon as poſſible.

I am, with the greateſt reſpect,
My Lord,
Your Lordſhip's moſt obedient
and humble ſervant,
ROBERT WOOD."

To the Right Hon. the Lord Mayor.

A peace at this inſtant will in all probability brand the times with epithets that will be ever diſgraceful in our hiſtory. Will not the people cry out, the peace of Utrecht revived! H—— and B——— revived! —Does not the general diſcontent throughout the nation ſhew how unfavourable and how unſatisfactory a peace at this juncture is to them?

We

We have been fighting France theſe ſeven years, and have met with little elſe but hard blows; and now when there is ſome proſpect of obtaining a recompence for the heroiſm and toils of our warriors, muſt their hands be tied up? Muſt a peace be ſigned juſt when they are entering upon their harveſt, and ſhall they be diſbanded as a reward for all their ſervices?

Peace! peace! peace! has been the cry ſince the nation firſt demanded vengeance on the Spaniards in return for their numerous inſults. Indeed could any thing elſe be expected? Or was it to be ſuppoſed, that they who induſtriouſly endeavoured to ſtave off this Spaniſh war, when the abſolute neceſſity of it was firſt urged, would not as ſoon as poſſible waſh their hands of all concern in it?

Was it not for this reaſon, that when the firſt conqueſt was made on the Spaniards, it became neceſſary to treat it as a matter of little importance?

When the Hermione's treaſure was brought through the city, all ſigns of magnificence and illuſtrious parade were avoided; perhaps as tending to inculcate a dangerous ſpirit to bravery and conqueſt among the people, who might from ſuch intoxicating ſhews grow fond of the war, and tempted to join in it. Can the wiſdom of our mo-

dern guides be ſufficiently extolled for this great act of prudence? How like the ridiculous old Roman triumph was that proceſſion, with which the French cannon taken at Cherburgh was brought through the city, attended with the colours taken at Louiſbourg? It was an incident of the utmoſt injury to ourſelves; the people grew mad with fighting the French, and the poor poltroons were not ſuffered to reſt in any part of their ſettlements. But how humane, how chriſtian-like, are our people to be for the future! what an alteration are we to expect! Sir Edward Hawke was ſent for home: was it feared he would behave ſo unmannerly to the Spaniards as he has often done to the French? or was it feared that our people would likewiſe go mad in fighting the Spaniards, that the Hermione's treaſure paſſed with ſo few attendants to the Tower?—To be ſure the Engliſh are an odd ſort of people, they love to bring their enemies to reaſon; and if they cannot convince them by fair argument and negociation, they are ſo hard hearted as to beat them into a conviction—until new comers and new doctrines are imbibed, by which it is logically proved they have been all the while in the wrong, and that *conqueſts are their ruin.*—Here is the clue to that crooked

maze

maze of policy, in which we have been wandering ſince Mr. P.'s reſignation.

But to be ſerious. It is ſaid we have been *ſueing* for a peace with France, and that they have ſigned the preliminary articles which *we have offered*. For God's ſake what can induce us to ſue for peace? Is it the general hatred, and even deteſtation, that is ſhewn to the new ——, that he is afraid of raiſing the ſupplies? If that be his fear, why does he not reſign (if he be a friend to this country) that ſome other man may hold that high office, in whom the people chuſe to confide? Or have they not abilities to carry on the war, and therefore wiſh for peace? Or is it becauſe the vaſt ſums, which the ſupport of the war naturally demands, are wanted to be appropriated to other uſes? — for we are neither in ſo humble, nor ſo poor a condition, as to *ſue* for peace from our enemies: there are ſtill immenſe ſums in the nation, and free hearts and hands to give them, if there be but confidence in the m—. There is ſtill a ſpirit in the people, notwithſtanding the loſs of Newfoundland, to fight our enemies; and there is ſtill a true loyalty and faithful affection to his Majeſty's perſon. With theſe advantages (which are the only ones for carrying on a war with ſucceſs) will not any man of honeſty ſay we have

have nothing to fear, and therefore ought to continue the war, till our enemies are compelled to *ſolicit* a peace *from us*, or at leaſt are reduced to reaſon?—but a man of diſcernment will anſwer, we have the worſt of all fears, that our confidence has been miſplaced, if we truſted to a vigorous proſecution of the war in hopes of being indemnified for the great ſums already expended, for now behold—we *are* to have peace. Is this the glorious opportunity for making peace, when the great council of the nation ſtands prorogued, and the French ſtill tremble at the names of ſome of our brave commanders?

To ſhew how injurious, how fatally injurious to this nation, a peace with France is, before they are ſufficiently humbled, (which is not yet) it will be neceſſary to preſent the reader with the following ſentiments of a Frenchman, which were laid before the French miniſtry juſt before the preſent war was declared.

" MOTIVES for a PEACE with ENGLAND.

By an old FRENCH SEA OFFICER.

THE peace of Aix la Chapelle gave us time, had we properly employed it, to raiſe a drooping trade and feeble navy. We drove on with a proſperous gale for a few

few, a very few years, till America became the ſubject of diſpute. Commiſſaries met to ſettle limits. We amuſed the Engliſh with frequent conferences, and at the ſame time we maintained our rights in America. They were, at laſt, wiſe enough to ſpeak to us in another manner; for whilſt we were gaining ſome inſignificant acres on the Ohio, they took our ſhips on the ocean. We drove them to this policy. They knew this would make us declare war, which we could not ſupport without ſailors, and almoſt all ours were priſoners in England. This was a blow we did not foreſee, but have ſeverely felt.

" Was it prudent to riſk our home trade, and to ruin all at once our marine, which began to recover itſelf, for the ſake of ſupporting ſome imaginary rights, and making conqueſts in America? Ought we not to have waited, at leaſt ten years, till we were in a condition effectually to ſupport our claims? The Engliſh would have done our buſineſs had we permitted them. They had neglected their navy, and diſbanded their artificers, who flew to France and Spain for maintenance. Whilſt their individuals ſquandered their riches, the ſtate grew parſimonious, and began to ſave in thoſe articles on which they cannot be too profuſe.—Was it our buſineſs to awake or

arouſe

arouſe them from their lethargy? Yet we did it, and the conſequence is obvious. We have taught them to believe a real truth, *They cannot ſtrengthen themſelves too much by ſea or land.* This is a reſolution we never thought of. This may be fatal to us; for the longer we carry on the war, the more their effeminacy will wear off, and their ancient ſpirit and courage revive. They will not have more wealth, but they will have more wiſdom. The military virtues and the manly exerciſes may become faſhionable, and the nation which ſeemed immerſed in debauchery and corruption, may think ſeriouſly, and be once more, what it has often been, the terror of Europe. This is not an unnatural ſuppoſition. They eaſily glide from one extreme to another. It is their natural temper, and their whole hiſtory is one continued proof of it.

" War may empty their coffers in part, but will add ſtrength to their body politick; and that ſtrength will ſoon refill thoſe coffers with large intereſt: whilſt we exhauſt our wealth, without any hope of regaining it by trade, which we can ſcarce carry on but by privateers.

" Charles the XIIth of Sweden diſciplined the Ruſſians. France has taught policy to the Spaniards as well as to the Engliſh. She has taught them the truth of

their

their old maxim, peace with England. Their ſagacious miniſters have turned the tide of commerce into their own ports, of which we are but too ſenſible.

" Our paſt conduct has, to all intents and purpoſes, really united Scotland to England. The former abounds in good officers and hardy ſoldiers. It even furniſhes numbers for the ſea, for their mariners increaſe by the vaſt increaſe of their trade. Their commerce ſtrengthens that of England, by opening more channels for the entrance of wealth, which inſenſibly finds its way to the heart of the kingdom, and from thence diffuſes itſelf into every part.

" This was a fatal blow to the intereſt of France, and is now irreparable: but even this is trivial to what we ſhould ſuffer if England ſhould behave in the ſame manner to the large and fertile kingdom of Ireland. What ſhould we ſay, if partiality and prejudice ſhould ſubſide, and that kingdom be viewed in a juſt light, and made a proper and natural uſe of? A continuation of the war will drive England into that expedient. If ſhe ſhould grant it the ſame liberty in trade as to Scotland, its commerce would extend, and a great addition be thereby made to the power and wealth of England, who would then have

docks on the weſt of that iſland, and fleets there ready in a moment for any expedition. She would then deſtroy our woollen manufactures (which at preſent hurt her's) as it would then be impoſſible to obtain materials. She would then furniſh the Iriſh with the means of aſſiſting her, and all this at the expence of France.

" The general weakneſs and ſupineneſs that for ever attends immoderate wealth and luxury, hides from the Engliſh the knowledge of their own ſtrength, real power, and true intereſt. Suffer them not to relapſe into virtue and underſtanding. Plunge them not to deep into difficulties, and they will never emerge from folly into real wiſdom.

" Give them peace; and they will ſoon return to their amuſements of elections, party and faction.

" Give them peace; and their navy will once more be laid up to rot, and their ſeamen and artificers once more be turned over to us.

" Give them peace; and we ſhall not fear the defection of allies, which will ruin our preſent ſyſtem.

" Give them peace; and they will never think of ſchemes for increaſing their people, or for making every part of their dominions of real uſe to every other.

" Purſue

" Purſue ſteadily the plan for fifteen or twenty years, conſtantly directing the riches of the kingdom to the raiſing a navy, equal or ſuperior, to England; and then, and not till then, ſhall we be able to ſtrike the blow we have, for above a century, meditated."

Here the Frenchman himſelf points out the danger of our making peace at ſuch a period as the preſent; and ſurely we ought to believe him, becauſe he ſpeaks in the intereſt of his own country, which always was directly oppoſite to that of our's.

Hence it is evident, that a peace with France, before her riches and ſtrength are exhauſted, is the ſame thing as bribing an executioner to cut off our own heads; and, by the preſent ſyſtem, France will never be exhauſted, till Spain is cut off from all her reſources in America; therefore Spain, as well as France, ought to be vigorouſly attacked in every quarter of the globe, before any terms of accommodation are ever thought of: for " this is the time; let us cruſh the whole Houſe of Bourbon*." Our fleets and armies are in the higheſt ſpirits,

* Mr. Pitt's words in the council, when he ſtrongly urged the neceſſity of a war with Spain—words that ought to be engraved in letters of gold.

and wiſh for nothing ſo ardently as to gratify their reſentments, by conquering their iſlands and ſettlements, and ſeizing their treaſures. It is a noble thirſt, which nothing but the very objects themſelves ought to quench; and muſt be completely done, in order to ſecure us from future danger, or in a few years we ſhall have another war.

As the French miniſtry have long made it clearly manifeſt that they never had any thing but ſiniſter views in all the negociations for peace hitherto ſet on foot, it becomes the duty of all honeſt men to join in defeating their purpoſes, by refuſing, as well to offer terms, as to liſten to any that may be offered, till they are ſo exhauſted in both riches and ſtrength as to be no longer formidable, and conſequently no longer dangerous.

As there is more of diſtruſt than ſincerity to be expected from our enemies, have we not reaſon to ſuſpect that there is ſome view for ſetting on foot this negociation? that it is done with a deſign to accompliſh a ceſſation of arms for a limited time? or, at leaſt, to make us relax in our meaſures; to call home our fleet, in order to furniſh an opportunity for the Spaniſh regiſter-ſhips, and French St. Domingo men, to get ſafe into their ports? by which the coffers of

their

their reſpective courts will be repleniſhed; and, as ſoon as that is done, the negociation is to break off, and the recruited enemies to reward us by the moſt vigorous efforts for our folly and credulity? That this ſcheme is not unlikely to be their principal aim every candid Engliſhman will allow; then let us think about means for defeating it: at leaſt let us think it is ſo, and be provided for the worſt. Let a ſpirit of patriotiſm and emulation awake the people with a true ſenſe of the ſuppoſed approaching danger, and let them preſent dutiful and becoming addreſſes to the throne, on the importance of our conqueſts, and the great neceſſity of keeping them; ſollicit the parament's being convened; and, like a free people who value their privileges and properties, inſtruct their repreſentatives on theſe invaluable concerns. Theſe are the only means to rouze the great into fear. Let us remember the ſpirit of former times, and conduct ourſelves by wiſe and animating examples. It is a merit in times of public danger to exert ourſelves in defence of our country: the Romans took a pride in it.

There are inſtructions ſtill extant, which were given by the electors of the county of Merioneth, to William Vaughan, Eſq; their repreſentative in the year 1742, which are written in a true *Engliſh ſpirit*, and worthy

worthy of preſent imitation; therefore it may not be amiſs to preſent them to the reader.

To WILLIAM VAUGHAN, *Eſq; Repreſentative of the County of* Merioneth.

" WE the freeholders of the county of " Merioneth take this occaſion to " put you in mind, that we, who elected " you to repreſent us in parliament, without " any other motive, without any influence " whatſoever, except the good Opinion we " had conceived of your Integrity, and of " your love for your country, think we " have a right to expect that you ſhould " attend the duty of that truſt, which you " have taken upon you. We conceive, " Sir, that you are bound by all the ties that " can engage an honeſt man, to attend it " at all times; but that there is more than " ordinary reaſon to be watchful at the pre- " ſent juncture, when (by ſome tranſ- " actions) we have reaſon to apprehend " that attempts will be made which can " have no conſequence but to increaſe our " grievances.

" We hope, Sir, that no private engage- " ment, no family-intereſts, will prevail " upon you, or any gentleman, to keep " from the place where the abſence of one

honeſt

" honeſt man may occaſion the loſs of the
" public liberty.

" As the impunity of public criminals
" may tacitly encourage and authorize
" crimes, we conjure you to uſe all means
" in proſecuting national juſtice, and in ex-
" amining the complaints of a feeling
" people; ſince the liberty of the whole
" depends on the integrity and virtue of
" the individuals.

" Hold no communication with thoſe,
" who no ſooner ſcented the air of a court,
" than they forgot the friends who confided
" in them, and the country which nou-
" riſhed them.

" We deſire, Sir, that you will keep a
" watchful, a ſuſpicious eye, over thoſe
" who are for degrading this once rich
" country, who are for reducing it to a
" province, to a land to which we are
" ſtrangers. In a word, exert an *Engliſh*
" *ſpirit*, in oppoſing all bad deſigns."

The right of inſtructing our repreſenta-tives in parliament, is a privilege which Engliſhmen yet enjoy, and I hope will ever be retained. Liberty is the darling property of Engliſhmen; but it is a misfortune that nothing is more evident than that the people of England may by good words be brought to ſuffer any thing. They fix their eyes upon the Sovereign, and whilſt they have

a gracious Prince upon the throne, whoſe glory is centered in the happineſs of his ſubjects, they are intent only on thoſe things which proceed from the throne, and hug themſelves in ſecurity.

Whilſt they are admiring the impartial juſtice of a judge, in a court of judicature, they ſuffer a —— to pick their pockets. Is there but one man in the nation who can make us ſlaves? Yes, there are thouſands ſmiling in our faces. Let us ferret them then from their holes; of whatever magnitude they are, or in whatever claſs they may rank themſelves.

Nothing is more ridiculous than to urge that we have nothing to fear from our preſent g———. Be it ſo. But why ſhould we put a ſword in their hands, more than juſtice requires? Such language is no more than this. We will prepare our necks for the yoke; but we know you will not put it on. A compliment, which might have been made properly enough by a people broken to ſervitude; but an Engliſhman, as long as he regards his honour, or his country, will abhor ſuch intolerable ſervility. Shall we ſuffer ourſelves, like Gibraltar, to be ſet up to the neck in batteries, without one effort to diſengage ourſelves?---Rather let us remedy the evil by removing the cauſes: if there be a want of money for carrying on the

war,

war, let us make a free-gift; ſhew our ſteadineſs to our own intereſts, our loyalty and attachment to his Majeſty's crown and dignity, and an unſhaken reſolution to ſupport him againſt all his enemies. Theſe are meaſures which will terrify the enemy, and invigorate all our commanders to act with a true Engliſh ſpirit. Let the grumblers who begrudge paying the land-tax, whoſe fortunes are immenſe, and whoſe avarice is unbounded, be regarded as the enemies of their country, who, for the ſake of ſaving a few pounds annually, are for precipitately concluding a peace with the enemy on any terms, that will in a ſhort time bring on another war, and impoveriſh perhaps ourſelves and our poſterity.

Can it be ſuſpected that there are any of the ſervants of the crown, capable of admitting a thought that would tend to diminiſh the credit or intereſt of their country by a ſhameful negotiation? The people have demonſtrated their ſenſe of merit in the late conductors of their affairs, and are ſtill willing, on all proper occaſions, to give them further proofs of it; and they will, no doubt, as warmly reſent any ſacrifice that may be made of their rights and properties, ſo dearly purchaſed. Let us not liſten to the ſound of peace, till our enemies conjointly make ſuch propoſals, as we may

with honour accept: rather let us ſee his Royal Highneſs the Duke of Cumberland, treating all foreign agents as they juſtly deſerve both here and elſewhere, put himſelf once more at the head of the Britiſh army, and render himſelf as terrible to the French and Spaniards as he was to the rebels; and, to the diſgrace of ſuch as make war a trade, procure us a ſafe, honourable, and laſting peace!

The REPORTED preliminary articles* of the approaching treaty, are

The Engliſh to have all Canada, and the ſettlements at the back of the Carolinas and Georgia, extending weſtward to the river Miſſiſſippi, which is to be the boundary, according to *Vaudreuil's map*†.

The French to have a fiſhery on the banks of Newfoundland, in the ſame manner as before the war, and, it is ſaid, to be given the iſland of Sable to dry their fiſh on. ---Likewiſe to have a ſettlement on the weſt ſide of Newfoundland, for drying, &c.

Martinico

* Although it is *reported* (and I hope there is no other foundation but report) that theſe are the terms; yet, I am perſuaded, there is no honeſt Engliſhman who will give credit to them, till he hears it from better authority.

† Vaudreuil, was Governor of Montreal, and had ſeveral curious maps of the country drawn there.—— Quere, as theſe maps were drawn by a Frenchman, are they not very falſe?

Martinico, Guadalupe, Marigalante, and St. Lucia, to be reſtored to the French.--- Tobago, and the reſt of the Neutral Iſlands, to be ceded to Great-Britain.

The affairs of the Eaſt-Indies are to be put on the ſame footing as agreed on with M. Buſſy laſt year.

Minorca to be ceded to the Engliſh, and Belleiſle to the French.

Senegal to remain with the Engliſh, and Goree to be reſtored.

The Havannah, if taken, to be reſtored to the Spaniards.

On theſe ſuppoſed articles (the moſt extraordinary that could be ever thought of, even if we were in a ſtate of bankruptcy) I ſhall make ſome remarks, tending to ſhew the importance of thoſe places we are ſaid to reſtore, and the low eſtimation in which all ſenſible men hold thoſe we retain; for to diſcuſs a point fairly, however intereſting to a King and People, is a privilege to which an Engliſhman is yet entitled; and I am by no means for abuſing it.

The Engliſh to have all Canada, and the ſettlements at the back of the Carolinas and Georgia, extending weſtward to the river Miſſiſſippi, which is to be the boundary.

The retention of Canada is principally conſidered, as being the firſt object of the war, and the ſecurity naturally derived from our poſſeſſion of it, to the Indian tribes at the back of our northern provinces; but it ſhould likewiſe be conſidered, that it is a country too ſharp for Engliſhmen to live in. It is exceſſive cold, and inacceſſible half the year, and many parts of it very barren; and taking ten years together, it does not produce proviſions ſufficient for its inhabitants, therefore it received ſupplies from France. Its only valuable commodity is furs and ſkins, and not enough of thoſe to pay for the woollen and other manufactures from France; therefore, in point of trade, it was rather a burden than profit to the French; but ever ſince the reign of King William, France entertained hopes from thence to be able to reduce and make herſelf maſter of our colonies, by a chain of forts at the back of our ſettlements; and this was the great reaſon that ſhe ſupported Canada: But we being now maſters of it, I will venture to ſay that we ſhall not reap much advantage from it in point of commerce; its great value to us is, that our fertile colonies will enjoy peace and quiet, and be no more annoyed from thence.

The French to have a fiſhery on the Banks of Newfoundlund in the ſame manner as they had before the war; and to be given the Iſland of Sable for drying their fiſh on. Likewiſe to have a Settlement on the Weſt Side of Newfoundland for drying, &c.

This article will occaſion great diſputes; for in one part *(the French to have a fiſhery on the banks of Newfoundland in the ſame manner they had before the war)* it is allowed according to the treaty of Utrecht; and in the latter part, the French ſettlement is confined to the weſtern ſide only. The treaty of Utrecht ſtipulates thus, " *Art.* XIII. " The iſland called Newfoundland, with the adjacent iſlands, ſhall from this time forward belong of right wholly to Britain: nor ſhall the Moſt Chriſtian King, his heirs and ſucceſſors, or any of their ſubjects, at any time hereafter, lay claim to any right to the ſaid iſland and iſlands, or to any part of it, or them. Moreover, it ſhall not be lawful for the ſubjects of France to fortify any place in the ſaid iſland of Newfoundland, or to erect any buildings there, beſides ſtages made of boards, and huts neceſſary and uſual for drying of fiſh; or to reſort to the ſaid iſland beyond the time neceſſary

ceſſary for fiſhing and drying of fiſh. But it ſhall be allowed to the ſubjects of France to catch fiſh, and to dry them on land, in that part only, and in no other beſides that, of the ſaid iſland of Newfoundland, which ſtretches from the place called Cape Bonaviſta to the northern point of the ſaid iſland; and from thence running down by the weſtern ſide, reaches as far as the place called Point Riche."

The treaty of Utrecht thus allows the French a part of the iſland on the eaſt and weſt ſides, as well as the northern extremity. The limits fixed by this treaty are what we are to underſtand by the words, *as before the war*. Perhaps it is meant, that the French ſhall have (beſides the liberty of drying their fiſh as abovementioned) an actual part of the territory of Newfoundland to erect forts on, build towns, *&c.* To this very great advantage, it is ſaid, we give them the iſland of Sable likewiſe to dry their fiſh on: as this is an advantage which they never had before, is it intended that the French ſhall increaſe their fiſhery, ſince they require more land for drying their fiſh on? If ſo, we ſhall ſoon be in a perilous condition; for the French, by an increaſe of their former fiſhery, will likewiſe increaſe their navy, as it will afford them great numbers of good ſeamen, to

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begin hoſtilities afreſh in a few years; nay, even contend with us upon our own element. Is it in conſideration of the French relinquiſhing Canada, that we are to give them the iſland of Sable? Or is it in conſideration of their reſtoring to us part of Newfoundland?—To ſhew the *real* importance of the iſland of Sable, it may not be amiſs to give a deſcription of it. It lies in lat. 44, 15 N. long. 59. 2 W. about 130 miles eaſt from Halifax in Nova Scotia, and about 100 miles South from Louiſbourg; it abounds with ſeveral fine ſand hills, has a large lake in the middle, and is about 20 miles in length, and three in breadth. Adjoining to it is a very large fiſhing bank, called after its own name; and contiguous to it are ſeveral other fiſhing banks, which extend along the coaſt of Nova Scotia, and are not inferior to thoſe of Newfoundland; and have this advantage, that the climate is by far more temperate than it is there; therefore the giving the enemy permiſſion to cure their fiſh here, is not only granting them a very valuable nurſery for ſeamen, which it is our immediate intereſt to prevent as much as poſſible; but it is doing great prejudice to our colony of Nova Scotia, which we have taken ſuch pains to rear and protect, as there is the greateſt reaſon to expect, that ſoon after this cedure all

all their fiſhery will be uſurped by the enemy, and the colony itſelf be encroached upon, and inſulted, in the ſame manner, as was done immediately after the late treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. Beſides, ſhould they fortify this iſland, and they doubtleſs would, it would in a time of war be a great eye-ſore to our harbour of Halifax; and though it has not either port or harbour at preſent, yet its ſituation and coaſt will admit of its becoming a neſt of privateers to the great detriment of our trade. The only way to deal with the Freneh nation is not to permit them to have an inch of ground near any of our North American ſettlements. In a word. it is the only way we can act with ſafety to ourſelves; and if this was not the ſenſe of the miniſtry when they demoliſhed Louiſbourg, what was it demoliſhed for? Therefore Sable ought by all means to remain in its preſent condition. The French are to enjoy, without this iſland, a more extenſive branch of the fiſhery, with its conveniences, than they ought. It was ſaid when M. Buſſy was here, that nothing leſs than *all* North America, and the *whole* American fiſhery, would ſatisfy the people of this nation for the injuries they have received. Have we ſince that time changed our inhabitants or our opinions?—I hope neither.

Martinico,

Martinico, Guadalupe, Mariga-lante, and St. Lucia, to be reſtored to the French.——Tobago and the reſt of the neutral iſlands to be ceded to Great-Britain.

The importance of Martinico will be ſeen by its produce. It makes annually about forty thouſhand hogſheads of white ſugar, and ten thouſand of brown, prodigious quantities of coffee, cocoa, and a good deal of cotton: it has an excellent harbour, to which all ſhips repair in the hurricane ſeaſon. St. Pierre is a very populous, large, and well-built town; here it is that the produce of the French Windward Iſlands centers, and from whence they are all furniſhed with European goods, as well as the four Neutral Iſlands. This iſland has ever been the terror of Barbadoes, Antigua, St. Kitt's, Nevis, and Montſerrat; and, if reſtored, will bring us again in a future war.

Guadalupe is extremely fruitful, and capable of very great improvement; has a pretty good harbour at Point Petre, and has at preſent about ſeventy thouſand negroes: it is in ſight of Antigua and Monſerrat, to windward of them, and not above twelve leagues diſtance. The great wealth of it at the time we took it was unknown,

and the ſole motive of attacking it, (as appears by the accounts publiſhed by authority) was, the deſtroying the neſt of privateers, which continually infeſted thoſe ſeas, to the great annoyance, and almoſt deſtruction, of the trade of our own iſlands. It is ſurpriſing, that now we are in poſſeſſion of it, we ſhould ſo ſoon have forgot, in what view it was conſidered when in the hands of the French. If we reſtore this Dunkirk of America, moſt probably we ſhall repent it in another war. On the contrary, by keeping it we may not only annoy them by privateers at the beginning of a war, but in the courſe of it; the iſland may be of great utility in facilitating our enterprizes in thoſe ſeas. It would have been much better for the nation this conqueſt had never been made, than to reſtore it now; for ſince we have had the poſſeſſion of it, the planters have been the chief gainers. They have ſold their ſugars and other products ſo dear, and bought their negroes ſo cheap, that it is computed they have nearly doubled their fortunes. If after this we ſhould give up the iſland to the French, ſhould we not be in the ſituation of a jeweller, who having received a diamond in the rough, ſhould return it beautifully poliſhed, without requiring any conſideration. The generous capitulation granted

granted to the inhabitants by General Barrington, not only ſecured that valuable conqueſt, but gained all their hearts, ſo that at preſent they are in general extremely diſpoſed to become faithful ſubjects under ſo mild and wiſe a government. By all accounts it appears, that the annual produce of this iſland is not leſs than 66 or 70,000 hogſheads, value 20*l.* each, beſides very conſiderable quantities of coffee, cotton, cocoa and ginger, which will employ, at a moderate computation, 4 or 500 ſhips to bring home, including the negro trade, and be a nurſery for at leaſt 5000 men. The Cuſtom-Houſe books will confirm this calculation.

Marigalante is as large as Antigua, and produces a great deal of tobacco and coffee.

St. Lucia is one of the Neutral Iſlands, and not above four or five leagues diſtant from Martinico, and has the beſt harbour of all the Windward Iſlands, and therefore claims our greateſt attention, ſince in all our iſlands we have not a ſingle harbour, St. John's at Antigua excepted. This iſland grows a great deal of coffee and cocoa.

It is computed that the iſlands comprehended in this article make annually at leaſt one hundred thouſand hogſheads of white and brown ſugar, the duty of which would be 600,000*l.* a year, if we keep thoſe

iſlands. Their coffee, cocoa, cotton, and rum, would amount to as much as their ſugar; and it could be eaſily made appear, that theſe iſlands would pay at leaſt one million a year revenue; and this would pay half the intereſt of all the money borrowed the whole war, beſide the amazing trade it would occaſion to the kingdom.

The Neutral Iſlands which we are to have are St. Vincent, St. Domingo and Tobago, all places of very little importance, and eſpecially the latter; of which a French merchant ſaid, if any perſon was to offer him a thouſand pound in one hand and Tobago in the other, he would take the money.

The affairs of the Eaſt-Indies are to be put on the ſame footing as agreed on with M. Buſſy laſt year.*

The Eaſt-India Company ought to determine whether this is for their intereſt or not? — Obſerve, Pondicherry was taken ſince.

Minorca ſhall be ceded to the Engliſh, and Belleiſle to the French.

It would be much better for Great-Britain if the French were to keep Minorca; for

* It is added, that the French are to have no ſettlements on the eaſt ſide of the Ganges.

for while we had it, our fleets in the Mediterranean did nothing but lie in the harbour of Mahon, under ſome excuſe of careening, watering, &c. Now we have it not, they muſt of neceſſity keep out at ſea; and perhaps it is owing to this neceſſity, that Du Queſne and De La Clue were taken. Belleiſle is of the ſame importance to us as Minorca is to the French; viz. an expence to keep it.

Senegal to remain with the Engliſh, and Goree to be reſtored.

Pity all the other articles were not equally as equitable.

The Havannah, if taken, to be reſtored to the Spaniards.

Why?---Why not an equivalent for this reſtoration? Would the Spaniards, if they had taken Jamaica, have reſtored it, unleſs we had given them Gibraltar, or ſome other place as valuable?---The Spaniards forced us into a war with them on account of their family-compact, and they ought to pay for it. The reſtoration of the Havannah without an equivalent will excite great diſguſts, eſpecially as it is probable it has, or will coſt us dear. Its importance has been too recently uſhered into the world* to need any farther explanation here.

Not

* Vide Gazetteer, Auguſt 30.

Not a word is reported to have been ſaid about Louiſana, nor the family compact, tho' objects of the utmoſt importance; nor of Germany, which I ſuppoſe is left to ſhift for itſelf, notwithſtanding the late defeat of the Hereditary Prince of Brunſwic; which I am afraid will go well nigh towards fruſtrating our ſucceſſes there this campaign; as the conſequence will not only be the junction of the French armies, but will give new vigour to their troops; --- and perhaps be not without its influence on the negociation of our ſuppoſed approaching peace.

Such is the *great* importance of the *ſuppoſed* articles of our future peace, which I perſuaded can never be the true ones,* becauſe I cannot believe there is any inducement on our ſide to the making of them: neither do I believe that our rulers are ſo deſtitute of all ſenſe of the national honour and intereſt.

Now ſuppoſing theſe are to be the articles (for all the way, I have nothing more than *ſuppoſed* it) what have we been fighting for? ---Canada and Sengal! --- Where then is the benefit of making war if we are to return almoſt all that we take? We had much better never put ourſelves to expence nor hazard of our lives, in attempting to conquer any thing, if it is to be reſtored. Are the millions of the nation to be ſquandered away without any advantage made of them, and the lives of men ſacrificed, and innumerable families

* I am glad to find it is *reported* that the *real* and *true* articles have not tranſpired out of the cabinet.

families ruined, only to acquire an empty name of glory? If this is to be the caſe, when at any time hereafter we break with the enemy, we ought only to act on the defenſive; and inſtead of attempting to take any of their places, only take care of our own; it would be great ſaving to the nation, and ſhew ſigns of foreſight and prudence.

By renouncing our conqueſts we renounce the very means for paying off our national debt: what then will our poſterity ſay of us, for entailing upon them ſuch a grievous burden of miſery? Will they not curſe the folly of their anceſtors? and will they not blacken us with appellations, which can be then no crime to pronounce? and conſider our daſtardly reported reaſon for making peace (at this critical time when there are ſo many proſpects of more advantages, whereby as well as by our preſent conqueſts the debt might in a great meaſure be paid) as an infamy that never can be wiped off, *viz.* "That we are undone; we cannot "raiſe money to ſupport the war another "year, and therefore muſt make ſuch a "peace as our enemies will admit?" --- If the French were in our caſe and we in theirs, they would not grant us ſuch terms.

Let thoſe who aſſert the above reaſon for making peace conſider, that as long as we have a Patriot King there can be no fear of raiſing what ſupplies are neceſſary to ſupport the war;

war; and of our being able to compel our enemies to the neceſſity of accepting ſuch a peace, as a Britiſh King ſhall think reaſonable to give. This, and this only can fix our ſecurity for EVER on a firm baſis.

Let us but follow the blows already given to our enemies, and there will in a ſhort time be the faireſt expectation, not only to get out of all difficulties, but to reduce their dangerous power within due limits for a long time to come. Nothing but our own impatience can hinder us now from what they prevented once before, by the ſame arts, in a parallel conjuncture. Let any man lay his hand upon his heart and ſay if (after the approaching peace is made on the terms as they are reported) we are ever to expect, or can always avoid a war with France? --- And when he has anſwered, that the growth and ambition of the French power, her breach of treaties, her rival-ſhip in trade, the natural antipathy and jealouſy of the two nations, muſt bring it unavoidably upon us in a ſhort time; let him then conſider whether there can be any ſenſe left in the people of England, if they are not earneſtly deſirous to puſh on the preſent war with the utmoſt vigour, now we ſtand in a ſituation in which we can hardly hope to find ourſelves again, in order to effectually humble our enemies, and compel them

them to grant us better terms for the ſecurity of our future happineſs?

In a word; as we have had a ſucceſsful war, can there be any excuſe for making a bad peace? Has it appeared that there is a want of either money or ſpirit to carry on the war? And, is not a peace at this time (when we have reaſon to expect many conqueſts) repugnant to the general ſenſe of the people of England? --- *Remember the peace of Utrecht!*

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